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Linear and Nonlinear Identities

John Arrington Woodward

Linear and Nonlinear Identities:
Problematic Identity, History, and the European Union

The massive transnational flows, flows of goods, people, and even
people as goods, which determine the contemporary state of 'globalization'
are but aspects of previously unsatisfied discourses on identity. This ossified
concept of identity is one that is bound to the nation in the nineteenth
century and early twentieth century, only to be cast outwards in the postWorld War Two 'age,' disseminated along lines of immigration, rapidly
increasing mobility of populations, and compressed in the contemporary
critical catchword of 'hybridity.' And while hybridity is the ability to exist in
a multilayered socio-cultural field, in terms of Europe it is one normally
reserved for the 'cultural other.' It is certainly a concept that seems central to
theorizing a space for these displaced and mobile populations; yet, it is one
that is itself bound inextricably to the old ossified concept of identity, or a
stable locus wherein the subject can position herself in relation to the social
whole. Yet identity is inherently unstable and indeterminate, and therefore a
contradiction develops in hybridity, one of transnational flow and ossified
connections.
One way of approaching this contradiction is, strangely enough,
through identity formation. The examination of identity has shifted
throughout the last few decades from 'immanent' explorations of the drives
to subjectification (e.g. Zizek through Lacan through Hegel, etc.) to
examinations of the 'realia' of identity, its placement in the constellation of
nation: state, community and so forth, and its representation in memory
narratives (e.g. Andreas Huyssen's work on East German identity, just to
name one example). In the context of the European Union, the question of
identity is rapidly becoming a political point of contention for all concerned,
especially considering the recent turn throughout Europe towards language
and culture requirements as an integral aspect of immigration procedures.

In the following pages I would like to exam the development of
what has been termed postnational identity, a political space wherein the
modifier of 'hybridity' neatly fits. This is a concept emerging in European
sociology and political circles that postulates a unified and culturally
trans~endent socio-political public sphere, and one espoused most
prorrunently, perhaps, by Jurgen Habermas. Postnationalism is seen as a
respite from nationalism while a means of utilizing social energies that are
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normally diverted into feelings of nationalism. It is, for Habermas, a manner
of combating nationalism as a negative and racialized feeling. I would like to
situate such a notion in relation to questions of and calls for national identity
and nationalism in postcolonial critics such as Partha Chatterjee and Homi
Bhabha. In this context, especially in Chatterjee, nationalism works as an
alternative to the homogenizing powers of global capital. Finally I would
like to draw out the relationship between these discourses, and how they
relate to the development of some form of 'identity' within the European
Union, by examining briefly Balibar's concept of 'European Apartheid' as
part of a critical discourse within Europe that can be found both within and
without academia.
The general question I would like to pose is, if there is such a social
formulation as the 'postnational' that can be located in the intersubjective
rather than the fictional subjective, i.e. as a guiding principal of social and
political interaction, would such a concept offer a crucial respite for the
'migrating' workers within the EU? Can we theorize mobility, displacement
or hybridity without relying on ossified notions of identity? Balibar's
concept of a 'European Apartheid' offers serious criticism of such a
possibility. Finally, are these concepts of postnationalism, nationalism, and
'apartheid' mutually exclusive or imbricated to a point of inseparability? My
theory is that the juxtaposition between what one could call linear
(idealized) and non-linear (realized) identities represents an essential
dialectic within European society and offers evidence of the emergence of a
problematic within the mainstream, wherein the 'liberating' assumptions of
Western liberal ideology are called into question.
I.

Before it is really possible, or before it should be possible, to map
out a 'psychophysical' location of European identity it seems necessary to
address the question of history. While this is a critical issue that has taken on
many forms in the past several hundred years, none of them completely
satisfactory, I do not hope to solve it here in one fell swoop. Rather,
preliminarily, I would merely suggest that the very concept of identity,
however it is construed, interpreted, developed or manipulated is inherently
historical and is inseparable from a 'historical praxis' or repetition and
reconstitution of such. There can be no critical examination of identity in its
many forms without addressing the place of history in such a construction. I
wish to address specifically the development of national identity, and th~s
am forced to tum to its historical development. But I also have a certam
critical point to this exercise that I hope to make clear below.

roots & routes
disClosure 17

73

Linear and Nonlinear Identities
Woodward

To begin the examination of history and its complex relationship to
the European 'national' narrative I would like to turn to Benedict Anderson.
In his Imagined Communities, Anderson speaks of the ideological function in
the construction of the colonial national space in the census, maps, and
museums of the colonizing power."1 This ideological function confirmed,
for Anderson, the colonizers' oligarchic power structures by supporting
teleological explanations of human, cultural and social evolution, and
founding the basis of such a power structure in 'reason' and rationality.
They were able to imagine themselves as positioned at the pinnacle of this
great narrative, looking synchronically across societies while 'seeing' the
diachronic development of human society. As Benjamin's angel of history,
the Europeans looked back on their own past and saw it 'repeated' in other
pasts around them. According to this Darwinist narrative, the archeological
/ anthropological evidence suggested that the western world had reached a
'higher evolutionary plane' than the colonized - the Europeans were, to
paraphrase Montaigne, the adults of the world, protecting their poor
relatives' children. 2 While Anderson is careful to limit his examination to
south-east Asia specifically, there is an inevitable double movement in the
function of these ideological constructs that reflects meaning back onto
colonizing Europe. The European borders, the limits of its own 'selfgenerating' understanding of itself reflected in the intersubjective, cultural
exchanges, were defined by the presence of the 'other' culture - if one
understands this 'otherness' purely in its signification of non-European.
That is to say that the self-understanding of Europeans in the modern age
was to some large extent based on the ability of the European subject to
(re)present itself as 'European-rather-than.'
Anderson works through the lens of European rationalism and
focuses on its physical and metaphysical construction of the colonial world,
through cartography, anthropology, archaeology, and Enlightenment
classification and collection; however, the function of this structuration and,
especially, its physical counterpart the museum, was to strengthen Europe's
hegemonic position in the world by providing empirical (preconditioned)
evidence to support its cultural-hegemonic claims. One vector of this
evidence was the very historical/ teleological vector that postulated Europe
as having reached a higher evolutionary-social plane.3

1

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections 011 tile Origins n11d Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 163-64.
2
See also Tzvetan Todorov, The Morals of History, trans. Alyson Waters (Minneapolis:
University of Minneapolis Press, 1995).
3 Cf. Todorov's reading of Montaigne (Todorov, op. cit.).

Clearly there is an innate 'postnational constellation' in a
configuration wherein Europeans are converted to a clannish race of people,
distinct from those primitive brothers persisting on the periphery. This
positioning of the European as a 'clan' in a fashion that elides essential
differences within Europe I would call the linearization of non-linear
identities. Linearization in mathematics is a process that reduces complexity
in non-linear formulas. Complex formulas, those where there is more than
one unknown integer, are 'reduced' in their complexity by substituting
possible integers for those which are unknown. Non-linear differential
equations are (so far) impossible to solve; thus the manner of approximation,
i.e. linearization, allows for the approximate solutions of these equations, an
important step in such fields as engineering.. In my use of the term, the
concept of linearization is roughly similar, though not as an isomorphism.
Society is inherently complex and filled with contradictions and paradoxes,
as is the concept of identity. The linearization of this concept occurs on the
sca le of the national as a means of 'solving' this problematic through
approximation and substitution. Thus the implication being that, when
presented with the non-linear, rational systems such as the rationalizing
Western society tend to reduce such complexity by substitution and
approximation. This reduction in complexity masks problematical issues
and works its way into a foundation for a linear, fully causal narrative of
history. The disjunction between these levels, linear ideology and non-linear
social systems is wherein the frictions that make up 'real existing' society
take place.
In explanation of such a tension we could see Anderson's
examination of the development of nationalism (as an emotive-social state),
while distinguishing between American nationalism and that of Europe, as
explaining the differentiation of one form of nationalism from another, at the
same time as establishing a 'partnership' in the very Weltanschauung of
nationalism. This can also be seen as an ideological linearization of various
nonlinear identities into 'isomorphic' groups, e.g. France is similar to
Germany in the very structuration of ideological nationalism. That is to say
that 'nationalism' becomes one aspect of the linear narrative of History,
which the very reduction of social difference worked to produce.
A specific difference between the European form of nationalism
and its transatlantic counterpart is, according to Anderson, the figuration of
'awaking' that ran through European nationalist discourse: "In Europe, the
new nationalism almost immediately began to imagine themselves as
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'awaking from sleep,' a trope wholly foreign to the Americas."4 This trope of
'awaking from a slumber' is mirrored according to Anderson in postcolonial, nationalist discourse (Anderson calls this 'mimicry'); but
importantly it reflects a drive within that new European nationalism to seek
out some autochthony within Europe, binding the search for the 'Urkultur'
into the search for the 'Ursprache.' The dream masked a basic bond to be
found retroactively as existing between 'originary' figures of nationalism.
The 'dream' from which they were awakening had been the supposed
forgetting of this European autochthony- a binding to the earth that comes
to a head in Nazi Gremany's infamous Blut und Boden concept. As Anderson
suggests the 'awakening' "opened an immense antiquity behind this epochal
sleep."S In other words, the awakening, which took the political form of a
return to something innate, a deep autochthony (or supposed cultural
autarky, as the case may be), something found deeper than the
intersubjective world of society; and stemming from a society nb origi11e, it
revealed a grander historical narrative, a narrative of world historical
import. This historical narrative was bound to language and archeological
knowledge ("wherever the lamp of archeology casts its fitful gleam")6, both
of which lent credence to the existence of classifiable, cultural European
autochthony, an original spatio-temporal location of European claims to
hegemony. The development of such a chain of history raised the 'specters'
of historical agents buried in the distant past of European nations, and
ground their bones under the wheels of national furor: "Michelet [makes] it
clear that those whom he was exhuming were by no means a random
assemblage of forgotten, anonymous dead. They were those whose
sacrifices, throughout History [sic], made possible the rupture of 1789 and
the selfconscious appearance of the French nation, even when those sacrifices
were not understood as such by the victims."7
By 'waking' from this slumber, the nations of Europe transitioned
into a new phase of ideology, a phase wherein the dead themselves are seen
to speak their desires through the mouthpieces of the ideological
apparatuses of the nation-state, and where the specters of capital haunt the
relaxation of socio-cultural restrictions on the middle classes. In other words,
the state (in the form of the king and Church) went from speaking for some
higher moral essence (God) to speaking for ghosts (the noble dead), all the
while simply transmogrifying the ideological essence to be voiced - the

4

Anderson, Imagined Communities, 193.
Ibid.
6 Ibid, 205
7 Ibid, 198
5
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source of its power-and distributing the centrality of state power over a
network of corporatized power relations.
A fundamental discursive action in this awakening is the tum to
the past, and the reconfiguration of homogenous, mythic history into the
'World Spirit' (Hegel) of homogeneous historical progress. This movement
was 'progressive' not only due to the reconstruction of a splintered,
heterogeneous and multifarious past into a causal continuity, but also as a
means of repositioning these post-revolution societies as 'freeing'
themselves from a particular past (the slumber from which they awoke), and
thus moving into a 'new' future. The awakening produced a pseudo-rupture
in history by making all things which preceded it a part of a dark, troubled,
dream-riddled past.
Of course, the figuration of awakening also subsumed many
cultures, regional differences, communal particularities and the like under
the one umbrella of national ideology. The pragmatic realpolitik which
brought about, for example, the creation of nationalistic Germany is always
already masked by Fichte-esque projections of telos-oriented national
identity, a generic narrative of sorts. The figuration of awakening then casts
the intersubjective foundation of social cohesion into the form of the national
within the bounds of European nations as an isomorphism- the microcosm
as the form for the macrocosm. s The binding of intersubjectivity and
nationality works in much the same manner as the inscription of Western
ideologies and concepts onto the new worlds they discovered. Nationalist
intersubjectivity becomes the social doxa necessary for all social
communication and the linearized relationship between nationalism and
autochthony is cast onto borderless parts of the 'new world.'
History is only truly historical, as Jan Pato~ka reminds us, in its
problematic state.9 Meaning that the truly historical only comes into being
as a vector within a social problematic, retroactively as it were, and as a
critical problematization of social and political normativity. And, as Jiirgen
Habermas has suggested, the development of a truly postnational public
sphere is inherently problematical and problematizes the stable relationship

s An excellent example of this would be the situation of the German Sorbs, who were
forced during both World War I and II to 'gem1anize'. To that point Sorbs existed ~s
'Germans' among their "German brethren" while preserving their non-Germaruc
'identities.' See e.g. Josef PMa, Aus dem kulturelle11 Leben der Lnusitzer Serbe11 nach dem
Weltkrieg, trans. Jan Skala (Bautzen: Kolo Serbskich Spisowacelow, 1930).
9 Jan Pato~ka, Heretical Essays i11 t/1e Plrilosoplry of Histonj, trans. Erazim Kohak and ed.
James Dodd (Chicago: Open Court, 1996).
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between liberal society and nation-state.10 Now, the configuration of waking
in European nationalism places it in a direct relationship with history qua the
intersubjectively constituted social narrative, and orients the European
nation-states synchronically-that is to say in direct or indirect relationship
to the alternative forms on which they border. It is, though, at the same time
a problematization of traditional, historical social order. It is not a stretch to
suggest, then, that the emergence into the problematical relationships of the
postnational in Europe constitutes a new phase of 'history' qua
intersubjectively constituted social narrative.
It could be suggested, as well, that the problematic nature of

nationalism inheres in its development, or prefigures its development, for it
masks differences within the community that could otherwise work to fray
the edges. The linearization of this problematical nature under the deep,
ideological structures of the historical imaginary lays the groundwork for
what Etienne Balibar would call apartheid. Heuristically, I would propose
that the process of development of nationalism is and was dialectical in
nature, not in the sense of the Hegelian dialectic, but in the sense as it is
beginning to emerge in Jameson and others, i.e. as a process in and for itself,
one that constantly subsumes the telos of critical thought-or rather one
whose telos becomes an aspect of each production, where each
intersubjectively generated telos quickly buries the one before. That is to say
that a teleology of the national historical imaginary would reveal a fnta
morgana as the end point, always shifting meaning, appearance,
representation, surely, but continually drawing the wayfarer into the
shimmering heat of the future. This seems to come through in Anderson's
postulation of the imagined community as 'synchronk', being, as it were,
based in the communal conglomeration of information into
contemporaneity. This therefore formulates an inherently problematic space
for the development of a concept of living-with rather than living-among: in
other words, people only see themselves within the nation as it disappears
on the horizon of temporality at that dialectical moment between Same and
Other. The question becomes, who is the other?
II.

Critiques of Anderson's work have come from all sides. However,
certain po~tcolonial theorists offer a way of reconsidering the ideological
unde~mrungs of western hegemony from within their own framework, by
returrung the postcolonial to its position within the hegemony. While
10

Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essnys, trans. Max Pensky
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).

Anderson's concept of a community developing within a 'homogeneous,
empty time,' is essential to his model, his insistence on both mimetically
mapping this aspect of modernity onto the rest of the world, and that the
European mode of nationalism is 'borrowed' by postcolonial nationalisms,
seems rather too constrictive. Partha Chatterjee has criticized Anderson by
pointing out that, "if nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose
their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made
available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to
imagine?"n. Chatterjee's critique is oriented around exploding the mapped
relationship seen to exist between the colonizer and the postcolonial state,
by exploring the fragments of subaltern political discourse which remain
within the nation-state form of the postcolonial world.12 Chatterjee's move
in this direct critique of Anderson is an attempt to develop a broader basis
for a heterogeneous universalism such that '"Western universalism' no less
than 'Oriental exceptionalism' can be shown to be only a particular form of a
richer, more diverse, and differentiated conceptualization of a new universal
idea."13
This does not mean, for Chatterjee, that European historiography
has not developed and propagated the concept of the nation and the 'people'
and then 'mapped' this concept into the minds of the educated colonized. In
fact, Chatterjee' s discussion of the relationship between historiography and
the development of the nation as chthonic concept mirrors Anderson's
examination of the same.14 However, Chatterjee' s focus is not on
demonstrating the relationship between the autochthonous ' other' and
globalized capital as demonstrative of the development of modernity in the
postcolonial world, a la Anderson. Rather, Chatterjee wishes to bring out the
co11flictual nature which defines and characterizes the relationship between
the postcolonial world and European modernity, by locating a "universal
community" in the globalized world: "There does exist a level of social life
where laboring people in their practical activity have constantly sought in
their 'common sense' the forms, mediated by culture, of such a
community."1s The struggle is not only one with the homogenization of
community but with historical linearization, and the communally-constituting
conflict, which is essential to Chatterjee, approaches both of these imaginary
vectors.
Partha Chatterjee, The Nntio11s n11d Its Frngme11ts: Colo11ial nnd Postcolonial Histories
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.
12Ibid, 13.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. 95-115.
1s Ibid. 199.
11
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It is, indeed, on the grounds of community that Chatterjee places

his search for an ethical lifeworld. In this way, there is a striking
resemblance between Chatterjee and Habermas; though, Chatterjee does not
go so far as to work through the construction or dynamics of such a
universal community as an expression of intersubjective experience. Indeed,
for the most part, this community remains an idealized space, its
relationship to politics ambiguous and unstable. Capitalism's narrative
conversion of "the violence of mercantilist trade, war, genocide, conquest
and colonization into a story of universal progress, development,
modernization and freedom," can only take place in the absence and
abnegation of community.16 He sees this community, though, as one based
in praxis and not history; thus, it can and should break free of the historical
ties that bind and bring itself into the political discourse of the nation.
In the end, Chatterjee dehistoricizes the political potential of the
community (as an autochthonous and yet de-bordered entity) for its
immediate political value, and in so doing restructures the colonizing
relationship suggested by Anderson. He does not emphasize a return to
some autochthonous cultural ideal for the discovery of temporal supports
for the concept of community; rather, he asks for a further extension of a
true homogeneous time. This critique of Anderson establishes the figuration
of an idealized 'universal community' as a 'postnational' counterpart to the
national subjectivity of the postcolonial world; but at the same time it
empties it of political specificity. This, by its nature, 'postnational'
subjectivity reflects to some large extent the very same discourse on
postnationalism in Europe, especially in relationship to the EU. That is not to
suggest, however, that Chatterjee along with many other postcolonial
scholars does not invest some critica l potential in the development of
nationalism in the postcolonial world; it does seem clear, though, that this
form of nationalism is fundamentally altered from that of the nineteenth
century. This alteration is particularly telling, in that it positions nationalism
as. int~r-nationally oriented, and leads to questions about mobility or
rrugration when the temporal homogeneity of the community takes
precedence over the realia of state-sponsored identity.
.
r:ieither Anderson nor Chatterjee go so far as to reconfigure the
relationship between modernity/ capitalism (seen as one and the same) and
autochthony as one that is mutually dependent and interwoven. In other
words, the march of capitalism across the globe is innate to its ideological
teleology ("making the world a better place") and cannot continue without

16 Ibid.

some pagans to convert. It is the 'third world' that has kept alive the
conquering teleology of capitalism. Chatterjee, in his latest work, does
explore this interface as representing the reality of heterogeneous time, rather
than the 'utopian', capitalistic (modernistic), homogeneous, empty time.17
He believes that the view of capital / modernity as unified and forming a
"time-space of modernity" is wrong because "it looks at only one dimension
of the time-space of modern life. People can only imagine themselves in
empty homogeneous time; they do not live in it. Empty homogeneous time
is the utopian time of capital. It linearly connects past, present, and future,
creating the possibility for all those historicist imaginings of identity,
nationhood, [and] progress ..."18 His suggestion that the 'other' times (read:
'primitive remnants of time' as seen by western rationalism) "are not mere
survivors from a pre-modem past: they are new products of the encounter
with modernity itself," offers a means of reflecting the disturbances of such a
production back into the Western sphere of cultural interest. 19 The mode of
resistance to the homogenizing processes of capital, then, are to be located in
the praxis of community, for Chatterjee. But this praxis of community must
bear some normative relationship to that of the state and cannot transcend
the normative processes within the state that determine the limits of
community, the boundaries between the local and the national, and the
global for that matter. The current migration of communities into Europe
poses this very problematic.

III.
For Chatterjee there is an important distinction between the
homogeneous state and the heterogeneous community; civil society appears
in his writing "as the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered
from the wider popular life of the communities, walled up within enclaves
of civic freedom and rational law."20 Clearly, the presence of the
heterogeneous community is essential to the generation of the nation and a
aspect that he considers under-theorized. The integration of the
heterogeneous community into the nation, however, is related to the utopian
time of capital (homogeneous empty time) and also the normative
'narration' of the state by and for the people. If we wish to see history as
problematical in nature, and its narrativization as bound to the development
of a historical imaginary whose function it is to homogenize the
Partha Chatterjee, Tl1e Politics of tlie Govemed (New York: Columbia University Press,
2004), 1-10.
l8 Ibid. 6.
19 Ibid. 7££.
20 Chatterjee, Politics of t11e Governed, 4.
11

235.
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heterogeneous nation, then the question of the narrative construct of nation
as corol.lary to this process seems inevitable and unavoidable. The concept of
the nation as narrative figures into the discussion of the formation of a
European public sphere in that there seems to be a fundamental distinction
to be made between the national narrative and the intersubjective realm of
the public sphere-a distinction that could be defined, again, as a distinction
between linear and nonlinear identities.21 For this I tum to Homi Bhabha's
maste~ful description of the nation in temporality as represented through
narrative.
Homi Bhabha, in much the same fashion as Anderson, constructs
the nation as a function of a particular temporal state (i.e. flux). This
tempera.I state is portrayed, in Bhabha, as a split between a homogeneous,
empty ~me and a more heterogeneous time, thus setting the ground for
Chatte!]ee's formulation discussed briefly above. However, Bhabha sees this
split between a pedagogic (historical / homogeneous) and performative
(heterogeneous) ti~e as runni.ng through a hegemonic structure, separating
: set. of competing narrative strategies that, together, generate the
amb1~ale~ce of modem society," which then "becomes the site of writi11g
the nation. 22 For Bhabha, the performative nature of the national narrative
off~ets. t~~ pedagogic (historical) construction of the people (autochthony).
~s diVIs1on, ho:wev~r, also insti~tes a temporal division, a "double time" :
The ~erformativ~ intervenes m the sovereignty of the nation's selfg'!1ur_~tio~ by casting a shadow between the people as 'image' and its
s1gn1flcation as a differentiating sign of Self, distinct from the Other or the
?utside. In p.lac~ of the po.larity of a prefigurative self-generating nation
itself~~ extrinsic ?ther nations, t~e p;rformative introduces a "temporality
of the in-between through the gap or 'emptiness' of the signifier that
p~ctu~tes linguistic difference."23 In other words, the generation of the
nation is not so much related to the establishment of an 'Other' nation or the
self-generated differentiati~n of nation from nation, but is internally
generated by the performative conglomeration of a liminal 'people' in the
ideal. of the 'nation'; and this liminality is itself derivative of the very
creation of the double-time instituted by the nation. Anderson also
distin~ish;s between a 'mythic' 'Messianic time' and the 'homogeneous
empty time (both terms borrowed from Benjamin). Bhabha's clarification on

these points is to associate the 'Messianic time' with the national narrative
and divide the 'homogeneous empty time' into double-time, where one is
performative and the other pedagogical.
Bhabha admonishes Anderson, as well, for not realizing that the
essential division within signification-as-an-act (basing his argument on a
Derridean conceptualization of signification) contributes to the generation of
the national narrative; and this contribution is the division between, what
Chatterjee would call, a 'utopian' time (that construct associated with the
idealized time-structure of global capital) and the heterogeneous time of
social praxis thus bound up with the internal differentiation which is at the
heart of the nation: "In embedding the meanwhile of the national narrative,
where the people live their plural and autonomous lives within
homogeneous empty time, Anderson misses the alienating and iterative time
of the sign. [ ... ] The 'meanwhile' turns into quite another time, or
ambivalent sign, of the national people. If it is the time of the people's
anonymity it is also the space of the nation's anomie."24 Clearly, by
inscribing the people into the liminality of the nation, as Bhabha claims to
do, he is seeking to generate a division between a hegemonic / ideological
concept of the narrated nation (the nation as narrated for the people) and a
heterogeneous concept of the nation (the nation as performed lnj the people).
He does not, however, clearly lay out in this essay a methodology or
heuristics for the exploration of what essentially amounts to the exploration
of cultural praxis (other than to suggest that his examination satisfies
Raymond Williams's requirements for a 'non-subjectivist' and 'nonmetaphysical' mode of explanation for the dynamic between the residual
and emergent modes of society).25
His mode of turning the heterogeneity of the nation into a
generative factor for the national narrative is, though, essential to an
examination of the dynamics of the formation of the national (and
international) public sphere. Bhabha's insistence on 'literary' narration, as
well, does not reflect the 'realism' of visual narration in seeming to represent
realistically the heterogeneous, performative community (and thus
'familiarize' its 'defamiliarizing' structuration). The ideological interests in
this representation doubles the national narrative (pedagogy) an.cl the
performative nation (spectatorship) into the interstice of reception.

2

~ A true dis.tinction between the homogeneity / heterogeneity binary and that of

linear I nonlmear remains to be formulated, but can be assumed for the sake of this
paper.
22
H.omi Bhabha, "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Nation," in
Nation and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha (New York: Routledge 1990) 291-392· 297
2J Ibid. 299.
I

I

I

Ibid., 390.
Cf. Bhabha, "Nation," 390, and Raymond Williams, Problems i11 Materialism aud
Culture (London: Verso, 1980).

24

25
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Though Bhabha works far too closely to the very autochthonous
nani:e of the ~a~on which ~e criticizes as historical (pedagogical), by
tummg the nations construction back onto its internal self-differentiation
Bha~ha and Chatt~rjee both dehistoricize the nation in its everyday social
prax1s b~ generating a model of nation that is continuously (circularly)
synchroruc rather than diachronic. This allows both to locate cultural
resist~ce (the. praxis of 'emergent' social action) in the very 'mimicry' of
colorual narrativ: forms. Thus, instead of seeing the colonized as just that,
compl~tel~ colon1zed and absorbed into the dominant culture, they establish
~ ~stoncal realm that can rework the historical narrative (filled with
bmar1es) through the filter of the synchronic social praxis of the colonized
(filled wi~h ~bivalence); ~ o.ther words one strategy of resistance against
~e colo~zer is the very rmrmcry' of form derived from the colonizers, yet
filled with synchronic social meaning for the colonized: i.e. the
representation of a heterogeneous time. As such, the historical narrative viz.
the historical imaginary, is reworked in this Bhabhian 'resistance' i~to a
heterogeneity informed by the synchronic conception of society.
. The question of History always figures prominently into the
estabhs~ment o~ homog~neous empty time as a utopian time, a figure of
mode~ruty, and ts a utopian space for discourse about the nation. It is, then,
on this level that the work of the historical imaginary takes place. What
Bhabha and Chatterjee's work suggests is that 1) there is what could be
call.ed an ideological division between the homogeneous empty time of the
nati~n a~d the heterogeneous time of social praxis; and 2) that the
relationship between the emergent social practices and the residual social
practice~ informs and reforms hegemony in some specific and, perhaps
paradoxically, ambivalent ways.
. The theoreti~al proble~a~c for Europe that arises with this general
model is perh~ps ob~1ous: does it imply that Europe is progressing to a new
manner .of nation? It is through the question of History that this problematic
can begin to be addressed, at least as it is reflected in European culture.
~ventua!ly, ~ t~nk we will. ~e able to formulate a critical concept of
postnational1sm as both stratified between an idealization and a realization
and as informing the intersubjective basis of European identity formation~
Indeed, Tzvetan Todorov, himself a strong proponent for the EU and the
European C?n.sti~tion, suggests that "human beings have always been able
~o dr~w a ,?~stinction between civic (or administrative) identity and cultural
identity.··
For Todorov this means the de facto preservation of regional
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identity, while reorienting politics towards the 'public sphere' (Habermas)
or towards a notion of 'constitutional patriotism,' insures the success of the
European project. The concept of 'constitutional patriotism' is one that is
gaining ground throughout Europe as a means of bypassing questions of
'ethnic nationalism' and still retaining the political community of national
discourse. The conflict that arises, according to critics in Balibar's camp, is
that this 'constitutional patriotism' will most likely retain many of the same
features of nationalism, especially the exclusion of the 'other' culture within
the bounds of the European geo-political space. One way past this
theoretical impasse would be a political and socio-cultural engagement with
the delimited and delimiting nature of the internal borders of Europe, the
liminal space wherein the development and praxis of the nation as fictive
ethnical unit competes with the nation as utopian gateway for immigration,
through a 'performative' relationship with history, borders, citizenship and
nation.
To summarize some of the disparate points here: We can view the
evidence on nationalism presented above as suggesting two distinct
concepts 1) nationalism as imposed form of identity (the ' top-down' form of
nationalism); and 2) nationalism as performative resistance and 'synchronic'
communal configuration (the 'bottom-up' form of nationalism). Both of
these assume the dissemination of 'nationalism' in its ideological form from
a cultural center, i.e. Europe. It also seems that one common aspect of the
development of 'postnationalism' is the return to a problematical, dialectical
process of emergent and residual social practices. This would seem to satisfy
Habermas' s requirement for problematization of the staid socio-political
debates in the face of globalization and neoliberalism as well as Bhabha and
Chatterjee's interest in heterogeneous praxis. Such a problematization
removes the subject from the safe cover of the historical imaginary and
thrusts them into the process of intersubjective social praxis, the very
real(ized) horizon of emergent social praxis. There is also evidence of a
conflict between the linearization and homogenization of identity and
praxis-oriented heterogeneity and non-linearity-such a conflict constitutes
community and the dialectic of nation stabilizing the form if not the content.
This remains, however, largely descriptive, historical in itself, and does not
address the inherently residual nature of such emergent praxis. To this, I
turn to Etienne Balibar.

IV.
While I have written to some length about postcolonial identity in
reference to the construction of European identity, I should now make clear
what has always been considered the distinction between them. One of the
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It is from this perspective that Balibar brings his intentionally

~eeply productive aspects of postcolonial theory is in the eradication of
fixed borders within the rationalization of the world system, running the
gauntlet between universalism and 'postmodern' individualism with
~droi~ess. Whereas th~ identity and communal structure of the postcolonial
inhents and engages with the remnant of the dominant culture both within
the bounds of the community and in the world market in the form of the
mode of production, the presence of the postcolonized other within the
borders of ~e ~uropean Union also signals a particular 'problematic' for
European identity. We should speak, in short, of an inversion of
postc?loniality ':ithin the sphere of Europe. The defining nature of the
coloru~s, elevating the Europeans to positions of educated, mature
gu~d1ans for t~e rest of the world, inverts in the postcolonial world and
continu~s t~ defme. even when European "axiological globalism" (Todorov
1995) s~fts mto .un1versa.li.sm and particularism. Many of the shifts, political
corre~tions, social transitions and the like that have taken place in the
twentieth century occurred as a result of new ethical readings of colonialism
and the colonizers' continuing social, political and economic 'responsibility'
to the colonized.

confrontational formulation of the European Apartheid. For Balibar the
separation of the European from the non-European within the public sphere,
within European society and European normativity, is the inexorable
development of a European apartheid which reflects a curious relationship
between Europe and globalization. This apartheid is spawned by the
incursion of the European market into new parts of the world, the opening
of the services market of Europe to non-Europeans, and the continual
inscription of non-Europeans as just that, thus both inside and outside of the
European public sphere, driving its economic stability, while being excluded
from its political, social, and ethical construction. Indeed, Balibar speaks of
this in terms of both an 'apartheid' and a recolonialization of labor power:
"European unification, far from counteracting tendencies toward
recolonialization of labor power resulting from the globalization of
competition, seems rather to be the instrument of their intensification."27
Bali bar's concurrent emphasis on droits de cite as a real political solution
offers the potential for the problematization of the issue in a manner such
that the resolution can only be through the structural change of the rights
and obligations of citizens.

i:ow does this change the formulation, then, for the immigrant/
postcol?rual other? The immigrant and postcolonial other in Europe is
placed mto the dou~le bind of determinant (non-European) and mnemonic
~the :rzem~nto colomarum). This destabilizes the performative nature of
identi~ m that the communal settings for such a performance are
d~te~ed not by. the imposition of an 'axiological globalism' and its
~1stor~cal remnants into the autochthonous lifeworld - an imposition which
in~emmates a temporal problematic, i.e. the figuration of 'rupture,' and thus
bnngs for.th the specter of history-rather, this relationship is oriented
ar~und i_rumetic ass~mila.tion. The route to Europe and into Europe is an
~nstotehan a~t of ffilmes1s, a act which is preconditioned as determined by
distance, and IS seen as such by the dominant cul tu re.

Where Balibar differs from Habermas, as voice of postnationalism,
in the representation of a problematization of European politics, is in the
telos. Habermas encourages the development of postnationalism in that it
problematizes the nation and the non-nation, a problematic which is to be
addressed, for Habermas, in the public sphere of socio-political discourse.
For Balibar the problematization alone is not enough and must lead to a
sense of civil disobedience. Both, however, see this initial problematic as
essential, as well as its critical working through-for Habermas to a social
consensus; for Balibar to an essential social reconfiguration. Indeed, Balibar
sees some deep-reaching potential in the European project as a 'vanishing
mediator' so he has little interest in abandoning the project altogether. The
difficulty is in the historical accretion of colonial ideologies and modes of
production, which Balibar sees as being reproduced in the current economic
orientation of European identity.

~oreov:r~ for many immigrants throughout Europe the question of
perf~rmative political engagement is outside of the bounds of reason and
legality. The sans-papiers in France, immigrants who are, normally waiting
for P.aperwork, applications of asylum and appeals, makes it very dffficult to
mc:mifest some fo.r m of political unity and resistance in the face of pending
ex.Ile~ th~ generation of a 'sans-papiers' identity is normatively determined by
~mmahty. And it must be re~emb.ered that this 'performative' engagement
is always engendered by the dialectical relationship with the (self-generated)
border,. according to Bhabha. In the case of immigration, instead of
gener~hn~ t~e bo~der the immigrant actually represents the physical border,
bears it within their very social existence.

I think it becomes clear that the link to be forged between what are
otherwise mutually exclusive theoretical formulations in Balibar and
Habermas is precisely in the development of a problematic. For both, the
inception of problematic history must come into play, must be worried out
as a vector whose essence, itself, is problematic. The critical evaluation of
Etienne Bali bar, We, the People of Eu rope? Reflections 011 Trn11s11ntio11al Ci tize11sl1ip,
trans. James Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 44.
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this history (these histories) then broadens the problematic and does not
offer solutions to it (for Habermas this could be seen as a division between
instrumental and communicative action) -rather, they expose the insoluble
nature of such a discourse. Once history loses this problematic nature, once
it normalizes, then it moves into the ideological realm of the historical
imaginary, wherein problematics are reduced to solvable puzzles according
to the emotional economy of mainstream discourse.
V.
In conclusion, I would like to address the issue of linearity and

non-linearity I brought up at the opening of this essay. I fee l that it is within
this configuration that one can witness the attempt at working out the
problematic of European identity rather than working through it- thus a
smoothing over of the historical problematic into a normatized discourse on
Europe rather than a continual readdressing of the problematic itself.
For immigrant communities and enclaves in Europe, the question
of political activism is restricted to one of initial legality and rights. A
'natural born citizen' (jus solz) has the right to involve him or herself in the
public sphere, a right granted by the state. For an immigra nt, however, this
right is the result of a bureaucratic process of acceptance in the eyes of the
state, an acceptance that is always bordered by linguistic, p henotypical, and
cultural difference. The immigrant must continually prove not simp ly his
legality in relationship to the moral legal system of Europe, but also to the
normative legal system of citizenship -she must always wear the badge,
carry the p apers of legality, of personhood, of acceptance.
In the context of Bhabha and Chatterjee and performa tive
resistance, the situation is reversed for the European immigrant. There is no
autochthony to which to tum, no primal communal life on which to model
this resistance. Outside of the hierarchical structure of immigrant
discrimination, immigrants are, traditionally, grouped into large enclaves of
decentered communal life, hovering on the border of legality wi thin the very
center of European cities. The performance of these communities is skewed
by the question of ownership - these are largely rental housing. Thus, these
members do not work towards actively formu lating that liminal people
(Bhabha) nor even a heterogeneous community, locked as they are within a
half-way space of legality / illegality. Yet, they do formulate the bifurcated
remembrance of a Romanesque multicu lturalism and forced imperialism they are the memento coloniarum on the one hand and the remembrance of
the p ower and attraction of the European economy on the other. Even
members of the new European states are relega ted to immigrant sta tus

within the core countries.28 And yet, the problematic of immigration and
postnationalism is in danger of being linearized.
What does this mean for Europe? The linearization of the
problematic entails the reduction of complexity for the sake of
demonstrating a singular answer to the problem. This process is currently
taking place in the political sphere of Europe, where a division is occurring
within mainstream political discourse over the rights of immigrants. 29 Such
a linearization employs a particular concept of history as linear,
teleological - a mode of history that I have called above the 'historical
imaginary' or the manner of narrativizing history outside of its
intersubjective foundations. Such a linearization eradicates the problematical
nature of history, which Pato~ka sees as its essential aspect. It also eradicates
the very problematizing nature of postnational discourse which Habermas
sees as critical. In other words, addressing the nature of citizenship in the
form of the postnational is also a means of addressing the situation of the
immigrants themselves, something that Balibar sees as essentially effected
by the turn towards the droits de cite.
So, the problematic of citizenship and immigration is not a linear
problem to be solved . Rather, it is the defining problematic of the new
Europe. Its resolution drives the processes of identity construction within
the European public sphere. And it must, indeed, continue or Europe will
again be reduced to an economic force and the apartheid that Balibar sees
developing will continue unabated. The central identity structure within this
problematic is that of the immigrant - in yet another determining moment.
The dialectic between citizen and non-citizen drives the processes of
European identity formulation. There would be little questioning of the
nature of European citizenship were it not for this postcolonial, postsocialist
other within their midst. And, as such, there would be no Europe.

Cf e.g. European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line, 'Workers from new EU
member states undeterred by restrictive policy,"
< http:/ /www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/ 2005/ 07/feature/ nl0507103f.html>.
29 Nicholas Sarkozy is now infamous (as of August 2006) for having his men march
into a Parisian school and take two children into custody in preparation for their
expulsion from France.
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